

Security Experts on Open Source



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Moderator:

Karl MacMillan

Director of Core Technology, Tresys Technology

Panelists:

Daniel Risacher

Associate Director, Enterprise Services and Integration, Department of Defense
CIO

Daniel Walsh

Principal Software Engineer, SELinux Technical Lead, Red Hat

John Banghart

SCAP Validation Program Manager, National Institute of Standards and
Technology

Steve Battista

Lead Information Security Scientist, MITRE



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Karl MacMillan

Director of Core Technology
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
Daniel Risacher

Associate Director, Enterprise Services and Integration
Department of Defense CIO


Daniel Walsh

Principal Software Engineer
SELinux Technical Lead
Red Hat


Before Virtualization




Good tools for detecting network attacks




After Virtualization



What could possibly go wrong?



After Virtualization



Hypervisor vulnerabilities

Not theoretical

Evolving field

Potentially huge payoffs

Xen already compromised...

Adventures with a certain Xen vulnerability (in the PVFB backend)

version 1.0

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1 Introduction

This paper documents the research by the author to understand the nature of and write an exploit for the CVE-2008-1943 vulnerability[1]. In x86_32 architecture case, the exploit can escape from a Xen PV guest to dom0. **The challenges posed by SELinux are taken into consideration.** Some techniques that failed to succeed with the default configuration (particularly, in x86_64 case) are also documented, because of their potential usefulness in other cases.

The exploits were written for Fedora 8 Linux distribution as dom0; it is the latest release of this popular distribution that comes with a dom0-capable kernel. Additionally, Xen 3.2.0 rpms (retrieved from xen.org site) were installed to the test dom0 machine.

2 The nature of the vulnerability





Who is the weakest link?



Host Kernel

Host Hardware
memory, storage, etc.





Enter SELinux...

SELinux is all about labeling

Processes get labels

Virtual machines are processes!!!


Files/Devices Get Labels

Virtual images are stored on files/devices!!!!

Rules govern how Process Labels Interact with Process/File Labels.

Kernel Enforces these Rules.

Libvirt – Dynamic Labeling in action



John Banghart

SCAP Validation Program Manager
National Institute of Standards and Technology

References

John Banghart – NIST – john.banghart@nist.gov

SCAP Website – <http://scap.nist.gov>

National Checklist Program (NCP) – <http://checklists.nist.gov>

National Vulnerability Database – <http://nvd.nist.gov>

NIST Documents – <http://csrc.nist.gov>

- DRAFT SP 800-126: SCAP Specification
- DRAFT IR 7511: SCAP Derived Test Requirements

Steve Battista

Lead Information Security Scientist
MITRE

Panel Discussion

Questions?

Tell us what you
think:
Complete the survey